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1 Introduction: (Hazardous) Waste in Contemporary Society
Whenever something is discarded, waste is generated. This can be a result of everyday
consumption in households as well as of production activities in agriculture, mining, energy,
manufacturing and construction. As such, this makes waste a part of everyday life, a normal
thing. Yet the increasing volume of waste generated globally is one of the most prominent
environmental issues we face today. Global municipal waste generation is currently about
2.01 billion tonnes per year and expected to increase to 3.4 billion tonnes in 2050 because of
population growth, industrialisation and urbanisation.  By 2050, the then approximately
nine billion people on the planet will have generated an estimated thirteen billion tonnes of
waste per year.  Next to the increasing volume of waste, there is also increased
hazardousness, because society also increasingly relies on synthetic and chemical products.
Hazardous waste refers to waste with radioactive, explosive, corrosive or toxic characteristics
and is likely to cause health or environmental harm when treated inadequately. An estimated
300 million tonnes of hazardous waste is produced each year by member countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), while no reliable
estimate is available for non-OECD countries as there is virtually no reporting.  Despite the
many conventions on waste that have been created since the 1970s,  the exact volumes,
origins and handling of hazardous waste generation thus remain unclear. This chapter
discusses two cases which concerned the trade in hazardous waste, but many dynamics and
drivers we discuss are rooted in the overall – and thus also non-hazardous – trade in waste.
Once generated, waste can be disposed of or treated. Waste disposal is the final phase and
refers to landfill, incineration and illegal dumping. Waste treatment is the process that
changes the characteristics of waste to facilitate its handling, to make the recovery of
secondary raw materials possible or to reduce its quantity or hazardous nature.  The
recovery phase in the waste cycle implies that waste is not just useless residue. What some
call waste is a valuable secondary raw material for others, especially in times of increasing
scarcity of raw materials. With the emergence of new recycling techniques and better
efficiency rates of waste treatment and recycling, what was considered useless residue years
ago has turned into something valuable today. In other words, waste has become a profitable
commodity.
The sustainable management of waste and (secondary) resources is key for the planet’s
future.  Companies responsible for the collection, transport, treatment, recovery or disposal
of waste thus fulfil important public tasks related to hygiene, environmental protection and
quality of life. Given these public interests, the waste market has traditionally been subject to
a high degree of regulation and close involvement by governments. In the Netherlands, for
instance, most waste facilities used to be owned and operated by municipalities.  However,










This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to anonieme bezoeker
developments are privatisation, merger activity, expansions and internationalisation. As a
result, the waste industry has become a highly competitive and capital-intensive industry. In
other words, waste management has become ‘big business’, and the market is dominated by
large and powerful commercial corporations that increasingly operate across national
borders.  To recuperate the secondary raw materials or treat the waste, there is often
international trade involved, because the waste treatment facilities for specific types of waste
are available only in a limited number of countries. Sometimes the nearest treatment facility
– or the one with sufficient capacity to process the specific type of waste – is simply located
across a border.  However, one of the most important reasons for the trade in waste is the
search for the most cost-effective way to treat the waste or dispose of it. Firms which operate
in multiple parts of the world seek a home in jurisdictions that allow their activities under
the best economic, legal, cultural or political circumstances. Previous research has shown
how these structural inequalities between different parts of the world can be criminogenic.
Corporations exploit these inequalities by moving activities that are illegal in one jurisdiction
to another where they are not (legal/enforcement asymmetries), externalise harms to
countries that depend on foreign investments to foster economic growth (economic
asymmetries), and engage in these harms, particularly when certain behaviours, such as
bribery, are normalised to get business done (cultural/political asymmetries). In addition,
awareness and knowledge about harms can be asymmetrical, as can the legal means to stand
up against big business. In this way, globalisation facilitates ‘crimes without lawbreaking’ or
‘legal corporate crimes’: behaviours that are essentially lawful, but extremely harmful.
Waste traders use existing policy or enforcement loopholes and offer officials in developing
regions attractive prices or bribes for accepting the (hazardous) waste into their countries.
The trade flows that are most likely to result in inadequate – and often illegal – recycling or
disposal are those from the Global North (Australia, the EU, Japan and the US) to the Global
South (Africa, South-East Asia and South America).  These same powerful economic actors
are also those most likely to influence international treaties and law enforcement in
developing countries.
Thus, while the international trade in waste material has undeniably enabled firms to expand
their business, it has also created greater opportunities for corporate crimes; led to the
transference of social, economic and environmental harms to other parts of the world; and
increased problems for monitoring and enforcement.  Substandard waste treatment and
disposal affects everyone but disproportionately impacts society’s most vulnerable who work
and live in unsafe conditions.
This chapter aims to demonstrate how companies operating in the global waste market
exploit legal and enforcement asymmetries and market complexities to trade waste with
parts of the world where the facilities to dispose of and to treat harmful substances are less
developed or lacking entirely. Our analysis draws on two contemporary cases of corporate
misconduct in the Global South by companies with operating headquarters in the Global
North: the Seatrade Spring Class shipbreaking case and the Probo Koala case. We have
chosen these cases because they are different in nature, involving different types of actors
and different types of waste. Moreover, these cases differ with regard to the attention they
have caught from the media and academia: the Probo Koala case has been widely covered in
the international media and has been discussed extensively in previous academic
publications, while the Seatrade case received less attention from media and academics. Yet
both cases present processes not well known to the general public and are illustrative of the
key drivers and conditions that enable illegal waste trafficking: the economic drivers and
conditions of the global waste and shipping industries and the regulatory drivers and
conditions with regard to waste management. Moreover, both cases have a connection to the
Netherlands and the Dutch legal system. Both cases relate to companies (i.e. Seatrade and
Trafigura) which are located – or at least have part of their business located – in the
Netherlands and could therefore be prosecuted by Dutch authorities in relation to the harm
caused by the transnational shipping or the waste disposal operations originating in Dutch
harbours. We do not claim these issues are particular to the Netherlands, instead they are
specific for dynamics between the Global North and South. Neither do we claim that these
cases are representative of all types of waste trafficking. The aim of our analysis is not
generalisation, but the comparative analysis of these cases does allow inferences to be made
about the criminogenic conditions of the global waste trade.
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As both cases led to criminal convictions in the Netherlands, we also analyse the difficulties
of curbing these issues through law enforcement and propose alternative ways to make the
waste sector more environmentally responsible and prevent the externalisation of
environmental harm.
In what follows, we first discuss the criminological roots of the concept of corporate
environmental crime and discuss that these corporate (environmental) crimes can be
characterised by different types of ambiguities that explain why responding to this
misconduct is challenging. Second, we illustrate these ambiguities in relation to the waste
market and to waste as a product. In sections 4 and 5, we discuss the drivers, dynamics and
key players involved in each of the cases. Our final section builds on a comparison of the
cases to explore innovative ways to make the waste sector more environmentally responsible
and prevent the future externalisation of environmental harm.
2 Corporate Environmental Crime
Edwin Sutherland’s 1939 presidential address to the American Society of Sociology
fundamentally impacted sociological and criminological thinking by focusing on crimes by
elite offenders, including corporations. Up to that point, crimes by and within companies had
barely received attention in criminal justice or academia, one noble exception was the work
by Dutch criminologist Willem Bonger (1916) who focused on ‘crimes in the suites’.
Sutherland labelled these crimes ‘white-collar crimes’, which he later defined as ‘crimes
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his
occupation’.  Ever since, the concept of white-collar crime has been the subject of
considerable debate, the key question being whether criminological inquiry should move
beyond criminal law notions of crime. Sutherland believed that it should, because elite
offenders’ harmful acts are often treated as mere regulatory offences, which have no criminal
stigma attached to it, despite the often enormous costs of corporate crimes in terms of health
and safety, the environment and society.  Today, white-collar crime is generally thought of
as an umbrella concept which includes, but is not limited to, corporate crime. However, the
analysis in this article does have corporate crime as a focus, more specifically corporate
environmental crime, which refers to those illegal or harmful behaviours that negatively
affect the environment committed by corporations or their officials for the benefit of the
corporation.
In the following decades, scholars continued Sutherland’s work by aiming to make
transparent that major – environmental or other – harms are not always incorporated in
criminal law, especially when these go against the interests of powerful actors in society, such
as large corporations.  Corporate crimes, in general, and environmental crimes, more
specifically, are often discussed in terms of various ambiguities that make responding to
these types of offences and holding corporations accountable for environmentally and
socially unsustainable business a very challenging task.  In many of these cases, conflicting
ecological and economic interests obscure where responsibility for the harm lies. Rather than
deliberately causing harm to the environment, corporations might have been careless or
negligent. Those responsible are not always treated as perpetrators within the (criminal)
justice system. This is especially true for cases of corporate environmental crime where there
are aligned interests among corporations and government organisations.  And, as we will
show in this article, this holds true for crimes in connection with international waste trade.
Because the alignment of interests between political and economic elites contributes to the
ambiguities surrounding corporate (and environmental) crimes, several critical
criminologists who study corporate crime stress the importance of paying attention to both
the general systemic causes of harm and the specific circumstances of harm or risk which
allow the blame to be placed on specific persons or organisations. Combining the details of
the case with a systems focused analysis avoids a preoccupation with a specific event which
ignores the socio-economic, political or regulatory conditions in which that event is rooted.
This chapter sets out to combine a focus on the events (i.e. the Probo Koala and Seatrade
case) with one on the systemic drivers and dynamics (i.e. economic and regulatory aspects of
the waste and shipping industries). Before analysing the specifics of both cases, the next
section discusses the ambiguities of waste as both a product and a market.
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Waste crime refers to the trade in, treatment of and disposal of waste in ways that breach
international or national environmental laws, and which cause harm or risk to the
environment and/or human health. This includes both administrative violations such as
disposal of more waste than the licence allows for and criminal violations such as the
dumping of hazardous waste. Waste crimes can happen both in the production and in the
treatment of waste, but this chapter focuses on the treatment phase alone.
Waste companies are often aware of the harms associated with substandard disposal of their
(hazardous) waste.  Moreover, some of these companies refuse to change their business
practices even when the disastrous consequences become clear and continue to lobby against
more stringent regulation.  A considerable number of waste crimes thus occur exactly
within the industry that was created to treat and dispose of the increasing amount and
hazardous nature of waste and provide environmentally sound solutions for it.  Scholars
have identified that the ambiguous nature of the product waste and of the criminogenic
characteristics of the waste market play a role in these crimes.
Waste is a product that has a negative value attached to it – i.e. it is something to get rid of.
This implies that waste has an inverse incentive structure: rather than paying for it when you
aim to obtain it (as with other ‘normal’ products), you pay for it when you want to get rid of
it. Thus, waste companies already make money simply by collecting the waste before having
to invest in expensive means of disposal. Although certain fractions of waste (i.e. metal) are
valuable, generators of hazardous waste generally need to pay large sums to have it treated in
environmentally sound ways. Illegal disposal can be 200 to 300 times cheaper than legal
disposal.  This inverse incentive structure thus creates an incentive for firms to ‘shop’ for
the best deal in waste disposal.
Furthermore, waste has been characterised as a product of low integrity. This implies that it
is a product which is highly vulnerable to (criminal) manipulation by blending or mixing it
with other products.  For example, many oil products have similar physical and chemical
characteristics as those of waste products, making the blending of hazardous and non-
hazardous wastes and the blending of waste and oil less visible and harder to detect.
Similarly, Van Daele, Vander Beken and Dorn emphasise the problem of so-called mirror
entries.  These define waste as hazardous only when the concentration exceeds certain
levels. By keeping the concentration under legal limits, the transportation, treatment and
processing of these wastes remain largely under the regulatory radar. Its low integrity also
makes assessment of the composition of the waste difficult, especially when blended with
other products, and therefore also makes it hard to assess toxicity levels and causality
between the waste and possible environmental and health consequences.
A final difficulty with the nature of the product lies with distinguishing between waste and
reusable products.  The regulatory framework under the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (adopted on 22 March
1989, entered into force on 5 May 1992) allows materials that can be reused to be
transported transnationally. In other words, it is not the origin of the waste that determines
its definition, but its use in practice. Yet, particularly with waste, this is often very difficult to
assess because in different parts of the world different values are attached to the same
materials or products. The global trade in e-waste demonstrates this.  This conceptual
ambiguity allows waste to be transported under the disguise of reusable goods, often to
countries that lack the waste treatment facilities to handle the numerous hazardous
components like lead and arsenic in environmentally sound ways. Moreover, the extent to
which products are (partly) reusable or recyclable also changes with the emergence of new
techniques. Although both cases discussed in this article concerned hazardous waste because
it had toxic characteristics, the ambiguity is about more than merely the question whether it
concerned hazardous or non-hazardous waste but also concerns the question whether it is
even waste at all.
Besides the product, the industry itself has also been characterised as criminogenic.  The
rapid growth and internationalisation of the industry have created complex global supply
chains in waste collection, transportation, treatment and processing with many different
actors and activities in numerous countries.  Businesses are often connected through
complex corporate deals, diverse legal structures in several countries and increasingly use
brokers, subcontractors and intermediaries involved at different stages to take care of
business.  Such interconnectedness makes it difficult for the actors involved to fully grasp
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noticed by others. Moreover, it creates opportunities to rationalise responsibility for harmful
activities, because it creates the opportunity to shift the blame to other parties involved.
Consequently, the transition from legal to illegal can occur at several stages of the waste
process, including in national and cross-border transport and in collection and disposal.
Because of these conceptual ambiguities with the product and the ambiguous nature of the
industry itself, there are ample legal and prosecutorial problems in cases of illegal waste
trade. It is often very difficult to assess the legal status (i.e. waste trade or trafficking) and to
find sufficient evidence to convict companies. A conviction ultimately requires proof about
the malfunctioning of certain products, about the exact composition of the materials, or
about the causality between the waste and the health or environmental effects. This evidence
is often retrievable only by investigations across state borders, which are often
cumbersome.  Holding transnationally operating (multinational) corporations criminally
liable for activities carried out and/or causing harm abroad is remit with issues of
(extra)territoriality and challenges of cross-border environmental law enforcement.
Similarly, criminal prosecutors have difficulties holding ‘big business’ accountable. In many
court cases, companies use these ambiguities to limit or exclude liability. The next two
sections describe two cases that, although successfully prosecuted in the Netherlands,
illustrate many of these ambiguities.
4 The Seatrade Spring Class Shipbreaking Case
4.1 Specific Circumstances of the Case
In 2012, four refrigerated vessels were shipped from the ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg to
beaches in India, Bangladesh and Turkey. On these beaches these four ships were scrapped.
These vessels contained several hazardous materials such as bunker oil, lubricating oil,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and asbestos. This practice is called shipbreaking by
beaching and is a type of illegal waste disposal. Shipbreaking refers to the practice of
discarding end-of-life vessels to reclaim valuable steel and other metals and is a legal
recycling practice. The shipbreaking industry reclaims the valuable steel and other metals
but also deals with highly toxic substances such as asbestos, lead, mercury, residual oil and
PCBs. When handled in unsafe ways by beaching the ships, these toxins affect the health of
the workers and leak into the coastal and marine environment.  The systemic drivers and
dynamics of shipbreaking by beaching are discussed in more detail later in this section.
Suffice it to say that there are many legal and regulatory loopholes that can be exploited to
continue this practice. In the case of the four ‘Spring’ vessels, the intent to beach the vessels
was proven in court  and constituted an infringement of the European Waste Shipment
Regulation (EWSR).
Spring Bear departed from Rotterdam on 15 April 2012, travelled via Alexandria (Egypt), the
Hormuz Street and Fujairah (United Arab Emirates) to arrive in Alang (India) on 6 June
2012. Spring Bob departed from Rotterdam on 19 April 2012 and travelled via the Suez
Canal to Fujairah, Sharjah and Khor Fakkan (UAE), arriving in Chittagong Roads
(Bangladesh). Spring Deli departed from Rotterdam on 1 May 2012, sailing via Hamburg
(Germany), Antwerp (Belgium), Al Khums (Libya), Malta, to arrive at a beach in Aliaga
(Turkey) on 3 June 2012. Spring Panda left Hamburg (Germany) on 9 May 2012, sailed via
Antwerp (Belgium), Al Khums (Libya), Malta and arrived at the same Turkish beach on 9
June 2012.
The four ships each had different registered owners, beneficial owners and commercial
operators, but all were tied to the Groningen-based shipping line Seatrade – world leader in
refrigerated shipping – which is also named in the court case. Each ship was eventually sold
with the contracts mentioning guaranteed scrapping and recycling.
Email communication between various employees of the ships, owners of the shipping
company and of brokers discusses the best option for the phasing out or scrapping of the
ships. The back and forth communication concerns the pricing, the location and whether to
change ‘to a flag state … which has no inspections or anything else as requirements’.
The decision to scrap the Spring class and beach them in India was considered to be proven
for each of the ships, although not all ships ended up getting beached there in the end. The
judgment refers to the cancellation of orders and maintenance for the ships and to emails
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which instructed them to keep the ships in service at low cost (i.e. low fuel levels). Later
emails concerned the removal of items on the ships (e.g. navigation equipment, paintings,
sextants, freon, etc.). Pilots and customs officials who assisted the departure from Rotterdam
of Spring Bob (18 April) and Spring Deli (1 May) recalled the captain talking about the last
voyage and the beaching of the ship in India. At the end of April, employee Z emailed the
captain of Spring Deli, instructing him to ‘Really sail on the minimum, because every ton still
in there on arrival at the beach is a waste of money’.  Bureau Veritas was also asked to
postpone inspection of Spring Bob because the ship would be scrapped.
The discussion about the pricing makes it clear that profitability plays a role. In an e-mail
dated 7 February, Baltic Union Shipbrokers refers to USD 40,000 to 80,000 per ship offered
by cash buyers, and Global Management Systems (GMS) offers USD 100,000 to 150,000 for
the set on top of the normal scrap price.  The broader financial situation of Seatrade was
also documented in the case file, referring to the low cash flow for the first quarter owing to
pressure on the reefer market and to the decision to recycle several ships, including the
Spring class, to improve cash flow. Thus, the organisational conditions under which
Seatrade decided to beach the ships are that the shipping line faced difficult financial
circumstances and that there was virtually no demand for used refrigerated vessels on the
second-hand market.
On 12 April 2012, employee S. emails that it is possible to deliver the ship in its current state
to Fujairah, which would save five days of operational costs but would mean a lower net sale
of USD 70,000 for each ship. S. writes: ‘Would it be worth 5 × 70k = 350k not to end up on
the name and shame list?’  This quote indicates that they were aware of the ambiguity of
beaching the vessels instead of dismantling them. Furthermore, one of the owners later
denies the intent to scrap the ships in India and indicates being familiar with the EWSR
when the Living Environment and Transport Directorate Inspectorate asks about this.
In a newspaper article, a representative of Seatrade stated that international legislation is
required to address this issue of shipbreaking because the European Ship Recycling
Regulation (EU SRR) is absolutely insufficient given that only 15% of vessels sail under EU
flags. He added that the Netherlands was wrong in suing the company because the
shipbreaking yards they were intended for had the necessary certification under the
conditions of the Hong Kong Convention. Moreover, ship recycling facilities in Europe were
supposedly insufficient to handle the demand. Finally, he referred to improvements made on
those shipbreaking yards and the impact on local employment in case beaching would no
longer be allowed.  This could be perceived as neutralising the responsibility for the
environmental and human harm caused by shipbreaking.
4.2 Dutch Case Against Seatrade
The Netherlands was the first country in Europe to bring criminal charges against a shipping
line and its owners for illegally exporting a discarded vessel which contained hazardous
substances. On 15 March 2018, the Criminal District Court of Rotterdam convicted Seatrade
for knowingly selling four vessels to scrap yards in countries with poor working conditions
and limited environmentally sound facilities to handle them.
In previous years, shipbreaking had been addressed by means of administrative trials such as
that of the chemical tanker Sandrien, which intended to leave the port of Amsterdam to be
beached in India but was stopped. After years of disputes between non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and the owner, the vessel was dismantled in Amsterdam and paid for
by the Amsterdam municipality and the Dutch state.
In the Shipbreaking Spring class case, the public prosecutor had initial proof of the intent to
beach the ships based on sales agreements and e-mail conversations.
The Criminal District Court of Rotterdam argued that the accused’s considerations were
merely financial and that a shipping line of this size – and its board member and CFO should
have been aware of the global problem that is shipbreaking by beaching.  The Court did not
follow the argument of the defendants that the ships were transported before the decision to
discard them was made.  Two executives received 50,000-euro fines along with a
prohibition on functioning as board member, CEO, commissioner, advisor or employee of a
shipping line for one year. The Court argued that six month’s conditional imprisonment,
which the Prosecutor requested, was not necessary because the offenders were first-time
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rather six companies belonging to the broader Seatrade company – received fines ranging
between 100,000 and 750,000 euro.
In later communication, Seatrade expressed disappointment with the verdict,
disagree[ing] with the legal interpretation of the Court that a fully certified, seaworthy vessel
should be considered waste.
They also mentioned sharing concerns of NGOs about environmental and working
conditions at the recycling yard, but said that addressing these issues requires the shipping
industry, governments and regulators to create a global level-playing field.  As mentioned
previously, this court case is unique in that no other European country has so far criminally
charged or convicted a shipowner for shipbreaking by beaching. In personal communications
with the authors, police and public prosecutors involved in tackling environmental crime in
the Netherlands also stressed their willingness to focus on the topic of shipbreaking.
Moreover, legal scholars wrote that ‘the Rotterdam District Court used the EWSR creatively
to address past practices of shipbreaking’ because the Court cited case law of the European
Court of Justice to define the verb ‘to discard’, which is central to the EWSR’s definition of
waste.  The EWSR was not designed to deal with ship recycling but was the only legislation
available to convict Seatrade because the newer international regulations which specifically
deal with ships (Hong Kong Convention and European Ship Recycling Regulation (EU SRR)
had not entered into force yet. Because there was a paper trail – basically the defendants
were sloppy – there was proof of intent and this allowed for a conviction of the company and
its executives. In many other cases, obscuring the paper trail is exactly what the actors
involved in shipbreaking do as the following discussion of systemic drivers will make clear.
4.3 Systemic Economic and Regulatory Drivers of (Il)legal Shipbreaking by
Beaching
Approximately 12,000 vessels become obsolete each year, because they are no longer
seaworthy, no longer meet the requirements set by the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) or because the economic context makes it more profitable to dismantle the ships for
parts and secondary raw materials than to keep them in business.  Part of those discarded
vessels are dismantled in top-notch recycling facilities, but an important share also ends up
being shipped to and dismantled in environmentally harmful, unhealthy and unsafe ways. By
beaching these vessels in developing countries, the shipping industry which is often
headquartered in the Global North flouts international regulations on hazardous waste. For a
long time, the exporting port states – where the ships deport from – did not apply the
regulatory framework on waste (i.e. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste or European Waste Shipment Regulation for EU Member
States) to ships as such being hazardous waste and only to the content of ships. On the
receiving end, an importing port state such as Bangladesh, although signatory to the Basel
Convention, rarely used its procedure of prior authorization for the shipment. Also the 2018
Bangladesh Ship Recycling Act has been reported to be a paper tiger due to insufficient
regulatory resources and lacking coordination between regulators.  Therefore, many of
these ships that were stranded on shipbreaking beaches in South-East Asia technically
arrived there ‘legally’ because the many legal loopholes were exploited.
In recent years, the most important instrument to hold (former) European owners of vessels
accountable was the EWSR (1013/2016). Applying the EWSR to shipbreaking cases implied
that the vessels themselves were considered a hazardous waste which, according to the
EWSR, requires treatment and disposal in ways that respect both the environmental and the
health standards. Holding (former) owners to account under the EWSR, however, proved to
be very challenging because it required evidence that the vessels were shipped to beaching
yards with intent to discard them.  In the Seatrade case, case law of the Court of Justice was
cited to interpret discarding. In other words, definitional ambiguities played a role in the
case. As discussed in the previous section, one of the legal ambiguities regarding waste is that
there is often a thin line between waste and second-hand resources. This conceptual
ambiguity of waste as a product applies well to shipbreaking because ships are classified as
waste only when there is intent to dismantle or discard them. Only when ships are
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facilities is it an illegal practice. This implies that it is up to the authorities in the European
port from which the ship is leaving to check whether it might be destined for a shipbreaking
yard in South-East Asia. Shipping lines try to circumvent these rules and subsequently
escape prosecution by sending their ships on a last commercial trade mission outside of
Europe or by providing paperwork that their ship is being sent to a yard for maintenance
work. As a result, the ship is still a commercial vessel when it leaves Europe, which means
that the EWSR is inapplicable and the shipping line is not responsible for the eventual
beaching.
These disguises are facilitated by the use of intermediaries, who use flags of convenience
before end-of-life vessels arrive at their final destinations (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) or
who change the name of the vessel, thereby disguising the original owners.  In most cases,
European shipping companies are no longer the official owners of stranded ships because
they sell them as second-hand ships to lesser-known shipping companies, which secretly sell
them as scrap ships after a few operational months. This practice thus involves many
different actors in a complex supply chain. This might result in some actors in the supply
chain not knowing – or claiming not to know – what other actors do, effectively neutralising
their responsibility.
The most important road to beaching is through so-called cash buyers, Wirana and GMS
being the largest. These companies are the most important intermediaries on the journey to
shipbreaking yards. Cash buyers purchase ships in cash regardless of the condition or
location of the ship. They get their profit from speculation with the steel price and often have
close ties with shipbreaking beaches.  On paper there is usually no link between the cash
buyer and the substandard shipbreaking, nor is there a paper trail with the beneficial owner.
This was different in the Seatrade Spring class case. In most cases, the ship is given a
different name to protect the integrity of the original owner, the flag is changed to a typical
end-of-life flag state that barely controls it, and the vessel eventually ends up stranded in
Bangladesh or on another beach undisturbed. Cash buyers also hide behind letter box
companies in tax havens, including the Mossack Fonseca law firm, thereby managing to
remain largely anonymous themselves.  As such, their business is legal, despite the harmful
consequences of it.
The IMO intended to strengthen requirements for ship recycling by means of its Hong Kong
International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships,
adopted on 15 May 2009 (Hong Kong Convention). Lacking ratification, this has not entered
into force yet, but, according to several experts, it is unlikely to make a real difference
because it leaves ample loopholes unaddressed and actually creates new ones.  For
instance, it describes how to dismantle ships and remove toxic material but is silent about
what needs to happen with the toxic substances once removed. More importantly, it
addresses the responsibility of flag states and not of possible other actors involved, such as
previous owners before vessels change ownerships or flags. Reflagging of ships is common
and happens with the object of avoiding stricter environmental provisions.
Applying the EWSR to end-of-life vessels proved possible in the Seatrade case, although
‘some boundary pushing’ was required (Ryngaert & Waardenburg 2018: 228). To address the
uncertainties and loopholes of the EWSR for shipbreaking, the EU adopted the EU SRR in
2013 (which entered into force on 8 January 2019) . The EU SRR stipulates the conditions
that ships and recycling facilities have to fulfil to be considered environmentally sound and
safe. The regulation also contains a list of approved recycling facilities. The EU SRR builds
on the criteria set by the IMO’s Hong Kong Convention, but sets additional requirements.
The use of cash buyers is, however, likely to continue in the EU, despite the newly
implemented EU SRR (NGO Shipbreaking Platform, 2013). The EU SRR still allows owners
to circumvent the law by changing the EU flag to so-called flags of convenience allowing the
use of non-EU approved shipbreaking facilities. Without cash buyers, it would be much more
difficult for shipping companies to relinquish responsibility for the stranded ships, but
regulation of the waste/shipping business has not dealt with this topic.  Reflagging is
allowed under the EU SRR, but these ships can then no longer visit EU ports because it also
applies to non-EU flagged ships.
Although the Seatrade case might be summarised as one where the company went in search
of the cheapest solution to discard the vessels, the drivers of shipbreaking by beaching go
beyond these profit motivations by shipowners alone. First, it is important to mention that
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International shipping, shipbreaking and the steel industry are competitive sectors with
varying financial interests depending on the countries of origin and destination.  In
Germany, for instance, the unique German Kommandit Gesellschaft financing system for
shipping companies means that they are actually owned by external financiers such as
pension funds or investment funds that originally intended to achieve huge profits. Several of
these funds invested in ever-bigger new vessels, because loan conditions were favorable and
because the Panama Canal allowed for deeper drafts.  The bigger freight capacity combined
with lower freight prices – sometimes even lower than the operational costs - resulted in an
estimated one third of the world fleet becoming ‘obsolete’ in 2016.  This self-induced
overcapacity in the shipping industry caused the investment bubble to burst and institutional
investment funds tried to limit their losses by opting for shipbreaking, made attractive by a
favourable steel price. In Greece, another major European flag state for ships beached in
South-East Asia, the story is very different. Greek shipping dynasties opt for the biggest
profits by choosing Bangladesh as the scrapping destination.  As a destination country,
Bangladesh also benefits economically, as its economy needs the steel, the employment and
the tax revenues that the shipbreaking activities generate. Here too the government plays a
key role in maintaining the current situation, because politicians themselves are (in)directly
involved in shipbreaking.
Second, although corporations as the beneficial owners of the ships are the ones deciding
whether and where to beach, government actors in both the Global North and South help
facilitate shipbreaking by lacking regulation or law enforcement. The global asymmetries in
tax systems and the loopholes of the legislative framework continue to allow shipowners and
cash buyers to hide behind cheap flag states and letter box companies in tax havens. As
described previously, the current legislation still allows for changes of ownership, which are
also easy to accomplish given the possibilities to use flags of convenience and letter box
companies. As a consequence, the regulators also have difficulty tracking ownership and
proving illegality when cash buyers are involved. As long as this situation prevails, legislation
that is aimed to address shipbreaking by beaching risks remaining merely symbolic.
Shipbreaking is thus inextricably tied into the political and economic context of trade, to
what critical criminologists call ‘systemic’ causes of ‘crimes of the powerful’.  Thus, in
shipbreaking by beaching, ecologically and economically irresponsible decisions are taken by
both companies and governments. Those decisions are not criminal in the legal sense of the
word because the loopholes of the law are used. They can, however, be labelled as criminal
from the perspective of the harmful consequences for the environment and health of third
parties that follow from these actions and decisions: the uncontrolled release of asbestos,
carcinogenic PCBs and heavy metals such as lead and arsenic, pollution of the ocean water by
oil and fuel leakage, and unfair competition for environmentally responsible demolition
sites.
In sum, shipbreaking by beaching is the result of a complex criminogenic interplay of
economic actors (shipping lines, financial institutions, cash buyers, classification companies,
and shipping yards) and political actors (port states, flag states, tax havens) on the national
as well as international level.  However, most of the ships that end up on beaches,
dismantled while violating environmental and human rights, are the result of perfectly legal
practices in waste or ship disposal. They end up on South-East Asian beaches because
reclaimed steel is very valuable to the local steel industry, because environmental regulation
is lacking and because working conditions are poor – and thus cheap.
5 The Probo Koala Waste Dumping Case
5.1 Specific Circumstances of the Probo Koala Case
Between the evening of 19 August 2006 and the morning of 20 August 2006, over 500
tonnes of hazardous waste was unloaded from the Probo Koala vessel and dumped in
multiple sites throughout Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast.  Even though the direct
causality is still contested, numerous deaths were reported, and over 100,000 people sought
medical attention. The waste originated from a new industrial process the multinational firm
Trafigura employed in an attempt to make money out of reselling dirty naphta as a
blendstock for fuels. The Probo Koala case can be considered unique in many respects. In
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companies which created the waste as a result of a new procedure to upgrade low-quality oil
into a tradable commodity, but it also took more than seven years before the case resulted in
final criminal sentences, and it was not until 2018, more than ten years after the disaster,
that an independent audit, by UN Environment, concluded that many of the environmental
effects finally started to be mitigated.
The case began in 2005, when Trafigura obtained approximately 28,000 tonnes of naphtha
which it intended to resell as a blendstock for fuel. However, the naphtha contained high
levels of sulphur, which produces a terrible smell and made it unsuited for direct use.  In
order to sell it as a tradable commodity, Trafigura needed to ‘wash’ the naphtha with caustic
soda. Attempts to perform these washings on land at suitable locations failed because, as
became apparent in internal emails that were disclosed during criminal proceedings in the
Netherlands,
caustic washings are banned by most countries due to the hazardous nature of the waste …
and suppliers of caustic are unwilling to dispose of the waste since there are not many
facilities remaining in the market.
Trafigura therefore decided to perform the washings at sea, on board the Probo Koala, which
constituted a new industrial process that had never taken place before.  After the washings,
approximately 554 tonnes of slops, a hazardous waste comprising a mixture of naphtha,
water and caustic soda, remained (Hulsthof Committee 2006: 9-12). These were stored in
the two slops tanks of the Probo Koala.
In June 2006, Trafigura contracted Amsterdam Port Services (APS) specialised in the
collection and processing of ship-generated waste and licensed by the Dutch authorities to
process waste from ships in line with the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL convention) to handle the discharge and disposal of the
slops. Trafigura described these slops as ‘gasoline slops (majority is water, gasoline, and
caustic soda)’ and subsequently accepted an estimated cost of €27 per cubic metre.  In the
Dutch court case, it became apparent that if APS had known the true origin of the slops it
would have estimated a substantially higher price for their disposal.
On 2 July 2006, the Probo Koala arrived at the port of Amsterdam. During the discharge of
the waste, APS took samples and then discovered that the waste was not the normal slops
that Trafigura had claimed it to be. The analysis showed a significantly higher chemical
oxygen demand and higher levels of mercaptans than normal slops, which APS’s licence did
not allow for.  Treatment of the waste required the use of a more specialised facility of
another company close to Rotterdam and would cost approximately €1,000 per cubic metre.
Trafigura, however, rejected this price and requested that the slops be pumped back into the
Probo Koala.
The vessel then sailed to Estonia, Nigeria and, finally, Ivory Coast, where Trafigura had
contracted a local company that had only been licensed a month earlier to treat this type of
waste to process the slops.  This company had agreed to process the waste for roughly the
initial price that APS had offered Trafigura before becoming aware of the hazardous nature
of the waste.  Yet, rather than processing the waste, the company dumped it on several
locations throughout Abidjan.
5.2 Court Cases About the Probo Koala Case
Court cases were initiated in Ivory Coast, the UK and the Netherlands. In Ivory Coast,
Trafigura agreed to pay a 152-million-euro settlement in 2007. In the UK, civil charges were
brought against Trafigura by a group of 30,000 claimants in 2009, which resulted in a
30,000-pound settlement, 950 pounds per claimant. In the Netherlands criminal charges
were brought against Trafigura, its president director Claude Dauphin and one of its
employees leading the blending operations. In July 2010, the District Court of Amsterdam
convicted Trafigura for the transportation of the waste in violation of the EU regulation on
the shipment of waste, and for concealing the hazardous nature of the waste and imposed a
fine of one million euro.  Its employee was sentenced to a conditional sentence of six
months’ imprisonment and a fine of 25,000 euro for leading the operations and concealing
the hazardous nature of the materials.  The decision against Trafigura was upheld in appeal
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did not have competence to decide on the matter.
Both Trafigura and the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (NPPS) filed appeals with the
Dutch Supreme Court, but both agreed to withdraw the appeals after reaching a settlement.
This settlement made the Court of Appeal’s ruling final, obligating Trafigura to pay the one-
million-euro fine. In addition, the company agreed to pay another 300,000-euro
disgorgement. Furthermore, the settlement included an agreement with Trafigura’s
employee to withdraw appeal in cassation on payment of 25,000 euro and an agreement with
Trafigura’s president director to withdraw the case against him on payment of 67,000
euros.  Finally, at the time of writing, a civil case is pending at the Dutch Supreme Court
against Trafigura by an NGO representing Ivorian victims. In April 2018, the District Court
of Amsterdam ruled that the case against Trafigura was inadmissible because the NGO had
insufficiently clarified how to safeguard the interests of the claimants and the Court had
doubts as to whether the proceedings would result in effective legal protection.  In April
2020, the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam however overturned that judgment and ruled that
the case is admissible and that the NGO had taken sufficient measures to ensure
safeguarding the interests of the claimants.  Following that decision, Trafigura lodged an
appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court in July 2020.
5.3 Systemic Economic and Regulatory Drivers
Although the Probo Koala case is one of the few successful criminal cases in the Netherlands
against ‘big business’ for irresponsible environmental conduct elsewhere, it still exemplifies
many of the ambiguities and complexities, described earlier, which make enforcement rather
limited in addressing and enhancing responsible business.
Discussion in the Probo Koala case centred on the nature of the waste and its legal status. As
mentioned previously, a key ambiguity in relation to waste is how to distinguish between
waste and reusable products.  Owing to changes in treatment and disposal techniques and
growing opportunities to recycle and reuse waste, waste can be transformed into something
useful, into a tradable commodity.  In the Probo Koala case this issue became apparent
with regard to the naphtha bought by Trafigura. Greenpeace and Amnesty International have
always argued that state parties should ensure that naphtha is defined as a hazardous waste
under the Basel Convention.  An investigation, in 2018, by the Dutch Human Environment
and Transport Inspectorate showed that most producers of blend stocks (such as naphtha to
create fuels used mainly in West Africa) are located in the Netherlands.  The Dutch
government thus has the responsibility to ensure that no hazardous materials are being used.
The Dutch government, however, stated that it is very difficult to define naphtha as a
hazardous waste, because it can also be used as a fuel.  Its legal status is therefore
determined by the value for the holder. Commodity traders such as Trafigura make money
out of reselling relatively cheap naphtha as a blend stock for fuels.
Another ambiguity of the product waste is that it can be difficult to assess the composition of
the waste, especially once blended with heavy oil products. During the court cases, various
experts appointed to determine the nature of the waste came to very different conclusions
about its toxicity and the causality between the waste and the health effects in Abidjan. For
example, the Special Rapporteur for the United Nations came to the conclusion that there
was ‘strong prima facie evidence that the reported deaths and adverse health consequences
are related to the dumping of the waste’, yet ‘a causal link between the deaths and health
problems and the waste from the Probo Koala had not yet been fully established’.
Trafigura has, on the basis of this ambiguity, always disputed and continues to contest the
toxicity of the waste and the causality of the health problems of the people in Ivory Coast. In
its reaction to the United Nations report, Trafigura contested the use of the word ‘toxic’ by
claiming that ‘any substance can be toxic in a given set of circumstances’.  In an interview
with BBC journalist Jeremy Paxman in August 2007, Eric de Turckheim, founding partner of
Trafigura, claimed that the waste was ‘absolutely not dangerous to human beings, smelly but
not dangerous’.
Since the composition of the waste is already cause for discussion, it is often very difficult to
assess who is ultimately culpable, which is another source of ambiguity. The fact that this
case involved many different public and private actors in various countries and different
legal jurisdictions allowed Trafigura to rationalise its own responsibility. For example, while
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to the Probo Koala. The key issue here was whether APS had already accepted the waste and,
thus, had legal authority over it. The Dutch Environmental Management Act at the time
prohibited the transfer of industrial or hazardous waste to anyone not authorised to receive
such waste. Had APS acquired legal authority over the waste, reloading the waste onto the
Probo Koala would mean a violation because the Probo Koala was not authorised to receive
such waste.  APS argued that it had not acquired legal authority because the waste was
never unloaded from the lighter (a smaller ship used to transfer goods to and from larger
vessels) to APS’s premises. Despite indications that the waste would be illegally dumped
somewhere along the route of the vessel, the authorities decided that the waste could be
reloaded onto the Probo Koala. The committee that investigated the events in Amsterdam
later stated that this decision was dictated by financial considerations and pressure by the
companies involved, which threatened to hold the municipality liable for the additional costs
(port fees; demurrage) involved in keeping the Probo Koala in Amsterdam.  The Probo
Koala case highlights how legal ambiguities combined with economic pressures enabled the
transfer of hazardous substances to Ivory Coast where the possibilities for environmentally
sound disposal of these substances were limited.
In the Dutch court case, Trafigura has always denied responsibility and shifted the blame to
the Dutch authorities, who officially permitted the ship to leave Amsterdam; the local
company for the waste dump, by saying that the company was fully informed about the
nature of the waste and was fully licensed to properly handle the waste; and the local
authorities in Ivory Coast, by saying that Abidjan is one of the most sophisticated ports in
West Africa.
As mentioned previously, many of these cases are remit with issues of extraterritoriality
which limits or excludes the possibilities of states of origin to enforce the case.  In the
Probo Koala case, a so-called Art. 12 claim by Greenpeace seeking to compel the Netherlands
Public Prosecutor to also prosecute Trafigura for the harm caused in Ivory Coast was denied
by the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam.  This not only creates opportunities for
multinational corporations to exploit this regulatory vacuum, but it also provides business
with arguments to rationalise their own responsibility. For example, Trafigura was very
successful in influencing public opinion by arguing that the court case in the Netherlands
had nothing to do with the dumping of the waste in Abidjan, which essentially was true,
because the case centred on the highly technical question as to which regulation was
applicable to the discharging and reloading of the waste in Amsterdam and whether or not
the waste was allowed to be transported out of the European Union.
The Probo Koala case not only highlights how firms use legal and enforcement asymmetries
and complexities in markets to trade waste to other parts of the world where the facilities to
dispose of and treat harmful substances are less developed, but it also illustrates how
economic and power asymmetries hinder holding these corporations accountable for
environmental crimes. Trafigura is one of the world’s largest independent commodity
trading companies. It has 80 offices in 41 countries across the globe, over 5,000 employees
worldwide, and in 2019 it ranked 27th in the global Fortune 500 ranking with a net profit of
almost 900 million dollars.  Its size and resources therefore allow it to fight allegations
effectively and to easily overcome the financial consequences that official sanctions may
have. Big business often does not passively receive negative attention in the media, but
actively fights back and has the legal and financial power to influence the ways in which it is
portrayed in the media.  Trafigura, for example, has made strenuous efforts to fight
allegations of wrongdoing and paid lobbyists and a public relations firm to deflect unwanted
media attention.
Moreover, legal sanctions often lack the power impact. Trafigura’s total costs of the waste
dump, including settlements, legal fees and public relations costs, were estimated to amount
to 254 million euro.  Yet, in the same year, the firm was financially very successful,
recording a turnover of over US$120 billion and a net profit of close to US$ 1 billion. Rather
than enhancing responsible business, these sanctions may even foster existing inequalities
between multinational corporations and the communities affected by their activities.
In sum, the Probo Koala disaster resulted from a combination of market dynamics, allowing
Trafigura to employ a new industrial process to make money out of dirty naphta, legal
ambiguities and regulatory asymmetries enabling Trafigura to transfer the waste to Ivory
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In the aftermath of the Probo Koala affair, the Dutch authorities took measures to ensure
that ships would unload polluted substances at the nearest port after leaving Dutch
waters.  One of the key questions after the Probo Koala incident was how the waste might
have left European waters to be transported to and eventually dumped in Ivory Coast. These
new measures prohibit ships from keeping the waste on board to offload it only where this is
as cheap as possible and proper treatment is not guaranteed. However, such measures
require cooperation and information exchange between various national and international
authorities as well as clarity about what qualifies as waste, rather than ambiguity.
6 Discussion
The increasing volume and toxicity of waste generated globally is one of the most significant
environmental issues of our time. Businesses responsible for the production, collection,
treatment, disposal of and trade in waste are key to addressing this challenge. This requires
businesses to take into account the impact their activities have on the environment and
health and safety of people, not only in the Global North, home to many of these companies,
but especially in the Global South, which is often less able to deal with the ecological and
environmental harms which the Global North externalises to them.  The two case studies
presented in this chapter have, however, shown that making corporations accountable for
environmental harms caused elsewhere is a very challenging task, because legal and
enforcement asymmetries and complexities of the global market can be exploited.
Key drivers of illegal waste dumping are the conceptual ambiguities concerning the waste
product and the complexity and interconnectedness of the waste market. First, both cases
have illustrated the relative ease with which waste can be disguised as a tradable commodity
or its qualification or composition can be disputed. This not only makes it very difficult to
hold corporations accountable in a court of law for harmful consequences of waste trade, but
also sends the message that the harms are ultimately debatable. This does not contribute to
efforts to enhance responsible business in global supply chains but indeed may even
undermine these efforts.
Second, our case studies have highlighted the complex and sometimes criminogenic
interactions between various actors in the international trade in waste products, between
various public and private interests and between the interests of countries of origin and
countries of destination. In global supply chains, corporate decision making becomes
increasingly more fragmented and often takes place at great distances from the locus of
actual risks and harms. Consequently, potential harms and wrongs across the globe are easily
overlooked or rationalised. While the harmful consequences of the international trade in
waste are manifold and abundant, these are often the result of legitimate business practices.
Therefore, the relevant actors in the complex global market are not only the supply chain
partners, investors, brokers or intermediaries, but also the regulatory agencies and NGOs
who choose (not) to invest in setting higher standards for waste treatment or disposal. In
both cases, NGOs played a role in calling attention to these issues, sometimes even providing
detailed documentation of harmful practices when regulators failed to do so. The role played
by the regulatory context is especially relevant as asymmetries in environmental regulation
and enforcement shaped both cases. The EU has chosen to set a ‘golden’ environmental,
labour and health standard by requiring ships that visit EU ports to have detailed inventories
of hazardous materials on board, thereby sealing further regulatory loopholes, although
others still remain ingrained in the economic system.
This kind of transnational, harmful business activity challenges academics to think outside
the box of nation-state frames of reference and look for the causes in the interplay of the
economic and political spheres. This also points to the importance of a broader approach
than a mere legal one. Although these companies work largely within the boundaries of the
law, but their activities are harmful. Our cases have shown that the criminal law is limited in
addressing transboundary corporate environmental crime.
Rather than relying on regulation and enforcement, we therefore argue for the need to design
innovative strategies that prevent the externalization of environmental harms. For
shipbreaking, the preliminary steps have been taken to this end with calls from several
experts and NGOs for changing the legal responsibilities of port and flag states for
shipbreaking. Because a majority of end-of-life vessels that end up on South-East Asian
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states. Flag of convenience states have been shown to rarely ratify and barely enforce
shipping legislation, environmental conventions and labour rights standards – a flag state is
free to determine conditions for registration in the country’s ship registry.  This allows for
original owners to stay anonymous and makes it virtually impossible for port authorities in
countries of origin or destination of the vessels to hold them to account for shipbreaking.
Only if the current legislation would go beyond the current flag state jurisdiction to require
genuine links between the shipowners and the flags they use would the enforcement of the
EU SRR or other shipbreaking legislation by port state jurisdiction become more meaningful.
This would allow for owners of ships leaving the EU for South-East Asian beaches to be held
accountable for environmental and social protection – the ‘polluter pays’ principle.
Requiring this genuine link, however, goes far beyond the drafting of legislation for
shipbreaking or waste, requiring an overturn of something which has been common – and
profitable – business practice in shipping for decades. In the aftermath of the Probo Koala
case, Dutch authorities required polluted substances to be unloaded at the nearest port,
thereby avoiding the shipment of hazardous substances to cheaper but lower-quality
facilities in other ports. Given the economic importance of the trade in (hazardous) waste,
this measure did not go unchallenged. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent it will
be successful in actually avoiding the transference of harm. This requires information
exchange and cooperation across borders and between different agencies about the (very
lucrative) trade in (hazardous) waste. Moreover, this cross-border communication is likely to
be difficult if it remains ambiguous what a polluted substance is.
There is still a long way to go to effectively organise such prevention measures, especially in a
global industry where political and economic interests are often aligned against limiting
business. Nonetheless, the cases in this article have highlighted what governments,
policymakers, firms and NGOs can do to prevent environmental harms abroad and make
corporations more accountable for responsible business elsewhere.
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